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Abstract 
 
 
There exist few studies of long-term small and medium size enterprise (SME) share in 
developing countries. This paper presents and examines evidence that SME share in 
Venezuelan manufacturing has experienced serious decline from 1961 to present 
times. Evidence is given of this decline in terms of key performance measures: 
numbers of firms, employment numbers and manufacturing value added. An absolute 
decline of this stratum has also occurred from 1979 onwards. Economic modelling 
suggests that efficiency and innovation variables are significantly correlated with this 
decline while a structural variable explains movement around this trend. This broadly 
concurs with studies in other select economies where these groups of variables have 
also been found to be significant. However, unlike Venezuela, these variables often 
explain a recent revival in these economies‟ SME share. In particular, we find 
evidence that the decline in Venezuelan SMEs‟ relative efficiency and innovation 
performance along with the prejudicial business environment cause this decline in 
SME share.  
JEL: C22, C51, C52, L60 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 The authors are responsible for any errors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Venezuela has experienced a serious decline in SME
i
 manufacturing share from at 
least 1961 when statistics first started being collected in this country.  This experience 
runs counter to some industrial countries where a revival of such share has been 
acclaimed, for example: the U.S. (Birch, 1981, Acs and Audretsch, 1990), the UK 
(Storey, 1994, Doi and Cowling 1998), and key European countries (Segenberger et 
al., 1990), including Italy (Trau, 1997), Greece (Thomadakis and Droucopoulos, 
1996), and Norway (Spilling, 1996). Further evidence from the Far East comes from 
Korea (Nugent, 1994) and Taiwan (Ming-Wen Hu, 1999). The evidence suggests that 
some industrial economies have experienced a revival
ii
 of smaller firm
iii
 share in 
manufacturing and the total economy. Long-term evidence from developing countries 
has been more difficult to obtain.
iv
 The purpose of this paper is to present and explore 
the evidence for the long-term decline of SMEs in Venezuela. We find that this 
decline is explained by the failure of SMEs to improve efficiency and innovation 
relative to large firms. This contrasts with studies of some developed countries, which 
find that such factors have helped to explain a recent revival in SME share. In 
addition we show that SME share is negatively correlated with the level of GDP, 
indicating, we feel, a business environment hostile to SMEs. This may help explain an 
unusual phenomenon of the Venezuelan SME experience – their absolute decline (as 
well as relative) since 1979. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses Venezuela‟s 
economic background. A modern history of SMEs in manufacturing is provided in 
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section 3. Section 4 outlines the modelling of SME share with empirical results 
presented in section 5. Conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
2. Economic Background 
 
The top left-hand quadrant of figure 1 shows Venezuelan real per-capita GDP
v
 
(PCGDP) from 1960-1992. We can divide the period in two showing a positive 
growth rate up to 1978 (1.7% p.a.) followed by a serious decline (–1.9% p.a.) from 
1979-1992. 
 
The 1960s and 1970s were periods of significant economic growth. The country was 
starting from a low base and benefited from immensely rich natural resources.  
However this growth disguised economic policies that were to lead to a severe crisis. 
There is a growing literature on the history of Venezuelan policy failure (Baptista, 
1984, Bitar and Mejias, 1984, Naim, 1984 and 1993, Enright et al., 1996, Hellinger, 
1996, and Buxton, 2001,). In addition there is a select literature, applicable to 
Venezuela, that examines the failure of economic growth in resource abundant 
countries (Lane and Tornell, 1994, Sachs and Warner, 1995, Sachs and Rodrigues, 
1999, and Manzano, 2000).  For the purposes of this paper suffice it to say briefly that 
these policies included the adoption of import substitution industrialisation strategies, 
state control over large areas of the economy, an excessive reliance on oil revenues 
and a commitment to large scale projects with scant regard to their efficiency. Policies 
were generally inward looking, highly statist and focused on a highly discretionary 
allocation of resources by government staff. SMEs were not a focus of government 
policy. High oil prices, while providing a short-term consumption-led boom, did not 
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guarantee prosperity. A demand-led temporary boom during the 1973-1974 rise in oil 
prices was followed by negative per capita growth for two years. Likewise the 1979 
oil price rise was followed in each year from 1979 to 1985 by negative per capita 
growth. By 1985 real per capita GDP was 19% below the level of 1972. Expansionary 
policies were followed from 1986 to 1988. These led to a temporary rise in growth but 
proved unsustainable. Inflation rose despite price controls, external reserves were 
depleted and widespread shortages developed. As the situation deteriorated, the 
government responded by further tightening controls on prices, foreign exchange and 
credit allocations making it impossible for the non-oil economy to be competitive. As 
a consequence, oil exports continued to account for over 80% of exports and more 
than half of government revenues. The policies followed up to 1988 led to a highly 
inefficient economic structure with low or negative productivity growth and an 
economy that continued to be highly dependent on oil and vulnerable to the vagaries 
of international oil prices. State-led industrialisation was accompanied by a serious 
productivity decline (Enright, 1996 and Paredes, 1993).  SMEs in manufacturing fared 
very badly. As we shall observe shortly their share of manufacturing value added and 
employment suffered overall serious decline in the  period of our investigation. 
 
The government of 1989, in contrast with earlier policy and also with its own election 
promises, introduced radical free market reforms. It began to dismantle the 
administrative apparatus for discretionary allocation of the resources of the economy 
and moved to reliance on markets. Liberalisation of exchange rates and tariffs, 
deregulated investment, cutting of subsidies and restructuring of external debt were 
part of the package. Immediate economic results were impressive: GDP, after a fall of 
8.6% in 1989, rose on average by 7.4% a year from 1990-1992.  Although investment 
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fell substantially in 1989 and 1990, it then surged in 1991 and 1992. Private exports 
were, on average, almost three times higher during the 1989-1992 period than in 
1988. However the structural reforms provoked serious political opposition to the 
government and this paralysed the reform process. The economic situation 
subsequently deteriorated with GDP growth becoming negative again in 1993. 
However the period 1989-1993 was characterised by experiments in free market 
reforms and this was accompanied by an increase in SME share in manufacturing. 
This was almost certainly due to the emergence of a less restricted business 
environment allowing a greater facility for small firm set up and growth. 1993 also 
saw a change in government and a return to the more state-oriented policies that had 
characterised previous governments. 
 
The deteriorating economic situation provoked an escalating banking crisis, as well as 
serious inflation and capital flight. Venezuela‟s economic and political system, 
however, has always been propped up by oil revenue, which is relatively immune to 
domestic difficulties. Oil GDP in 1994 rose by 4.6% and by 6% in 1995. 
 
The late 1970s are the turning point in all the performance measures of the 
Venezuelan economy. For example, the percentage change in three main indicators, 
GDP per-capita, gross fixed capital formation and real oil revenue are given in Table 
I. 
 
Table I shows a reversal from positive and very favourable growth in the chosen first 
period to exactly the contrary in the second. The oil revenues in particular are a 
leading indicator since they underlie the political and economic system. Their serious 
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decline clearly has major immediate explanatory weight for the crisis of the 1980s. 
Gross fixed capital formation rose substantially in the 1970s reaching 42% of GDP in 
1978. By 1990, at 12%, they were one of the lowest in Latin America. The GDP rise 
from 1961-1979 and the fall from 1979-1990 have already been noted and, of course, 
reflect the above two measures. 
 
It is clear that Venezuela has been in deep economic crisis for many decades and that 
its oil wealth has allowed it to continue postponing the severe reforms that it 
inevitably faces. SMEs throughout the 1961-1995 period in general fared badly. Let 
us examine this in more detail. 
 
3. History of SMEs in  Modern Manufacture    
 
The history of Venezuelan manufacturing from 1961-1995 divides into two periods 
that closely parallel the experience of the economy as a whole. Firstly, 1961-1978 was 
a period of growth in manufacturing as well as the total economy. Secondly, 1979-
1995 was a period of volatile decline. SME share on all major measures 
(establishment numbers, employment numbers and manufacturing value added - 
MVA) declined throughout. The first period saw unremitting and severe decline. The 
second saw a less serious decline of share and more volatility, i.e. a reversal of the 
declining trend was experienced in some years reflecting volatility in GDP growth. 
The date of the change from one period to another slightly alters according to the 
measure used. For establishment numbers it is 1975, for employment share it is 1978 
while for MVA share it is 1976. 
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The total stock
vi
 of firms in manufacturing in Venezuela failed to grow significantly 
from 1960-1995.  In 1961 there were 7531 firms, while 34 years later there were only 
8864 - a growth of 15%. The only period of significant growth was in the 1970s. The 
overall picture of the manufacturing sector is of stagnation.
vii
 However the very small 
number of large firms (196 in 1961) did increase by over 4 times. The real stagnation 
was in the SME sector whose total numbers were, and still are, very small by 
international standards.
viii
  The top right-hand quadrant of figure 1 shows large firm 
numbers (NL) while the bottom left-hand quadrant of this figure shows SME numbers 
(NS).  
 
SME share of the stock of establishment numbers (NSS), shown in the bottom right-
hand quadrant of figure 1, declined throughout from 97.4% in 1961 to 90.4% in 1995. 
However its most notable relative decline was in the period of fast growth in the 
1960s and the early 1970s. Subsequent decline of share in the second period 1979-
1995 was less pronounced though still evident. 
 
Total manufacturing employment numbers (LT) dramatically increased from 160,000 
in 1961 to 484,000 in 1979 but dropped to 442,000 in 1995. Total manufacturing 
employment stagnated from 1979-1995. Absolute SME employment figures (LS) 
almost doubled in the first period from 102,000 in 1961 to 199,000 by 1979. 
Subsequently they declined to 185,000 by 1995. Large firm employment numbers 
(LL) also fell in this second period from 285,000 to 267,000. Again the picture is of 
stagnation in the second period. These are plotted in the top left-hand quadrant of 
figure 2. 
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Similarly SME employment share (LSS) fell in both periods, especially the first: the 
period of fast economic growth – see the top right-hand quadrant of figure 2. It 
dramatically dropped throughout the whole period, from 63% in 1961 to 41% in 1979 
and 39% in 1995. By international standards the employment numbers in the SME 
manufacturing sector are very small by the end of the period. In 1995 only 420,000 
employees were in Venezuelan manufacturing - 70,000 less than in 1979.  
 
Overall Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) resembled GDP with growth in the first 
period and stagnation with volatility in the second. The bottom left-hand quadrant of 
figure 2 shows the growth in the first period up to 1979 and the subsequent stagnation.   
 
The bottom right-hand quadrant of figure 2 shows the trend of the dramatic fall in 
SME MVA share (QSS), falling from a share of 40% in 1961 to 20% in 1979 to 14% 
in 1995. In general SME share was inversely correlated with manufacturing output 
and GDP. When there was significant recession SME share tended to increase.  
 
In summary a number of significant features of this whole period stand out. Firstly 
SME decline is evident on all three measures: stock of establishment numbers, 
employment and MVA. Secondly decline is both relative and absolute. SME relative 
decline was most severe in the early period of fast growth 1961-1979. However 
relative decline was still experienced in the second period, 1979-1995, though to a 
lesser extent. Absolute decline on all three measures was experienced in the second 
period – though not in the first. Thirdly SME share is negatively correlated with both  
MVA growth and GDP. The exception to this is the 1990-1993 period where 
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structural market reforms allowed SMEs to increase their share at a time of GDP 
growth. 
 
We now explore the reasons for this serious decline of SMEs‟ share. 
 
4. Modelling SME Share  
 
Acs and Audretsch  (1989) - hereafter AA - developed a model examining small firm 
share suggesting that it is significantly related to three groups of variables: structural, 
efficiency and innovation variables. The model‟s results were that SME share … 
“is negatively related to the existence of structural barriers, positively related to the 
extent to which small firms rely on a strategy of innovation, and negatively related to 
the efficiency differential between small and large enterprises.” (AA  p.399). These 
three groups of variables can be broadly explained as follows. 
 
Firstly, structural variables (sometimes known as market variables) in the 
manufacturing sector include capital intensity and market size. These may be 
envisaged as barriers to entry for small firms since their presence, when significant, 
favour large firms which benefit from increasing levels of capital intensity or 
economies of scale. The level of advertising and import penetration in a sector are 
also occasionally employed as structural variables since they may also constitute 
barriers to small firm entry and limit national competition. 
 
Secondly, smaller firms may increase their share vis-à-vis large firms if they become 
comparatively more efficient, i.e. improve their relative efficiency variables. For 
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example, increasing comparative productivity of SMEs relative to large firms may be 
measured in labour and capital productivity figures.  
 
Thirdly, greater innovation efforts by smaller firms compared to large firms should 
likewise see greater SME share.  In expanding markets, where large firms can reap 
economies of scale, smaller firms may offset these disadvantages arising from 
structural variables by engaging in efficiency and innovation efforts. For example, 
smaller firms may take advantage of flexible technologies to compete with larger ones 
(Carlsson 1984). Of course the converse applies. When small firms fail, for whatever 
reasons, to engage in such innovation and efficiency measures, declining share is 
expected. This is also the Venezuelan experience. 
 
This examination of these variables has been applied to U.S. data by AA. They found 
that high barriers to entry in the industry (i.e. advertising, industry capital, the 
concentration ratio and industry innovation rates) had a negative influence on SME share 
in U.S. manufacturing. However medium size firms (100-500 employees in the case of 
the U.S.) could compensate for these disadvantages if they improved their relative 
efficiency and innovation performance. 
 
Thomadakis and Droucopoulos (1996) - hereafter TD - have also explored these 
variables in Greek manufacturing. They analysed the period 1983 – 1990 and looked at 
slightly different variables. They found that barriers to entry in the form of capital 
intensity and advertising (product differentiation) had no significant impact on SME 
share. Market size had a strong negative influence while import penetration was not 
significant. Three performance variables were examined. Relative capital intensity and 
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relative efficiency were very significant. However relative investment intensity was 
insignificant. TD found some evidence of structural barriers having negative impact 
though not to the same extent as the AA study of the U.S. They did find substantial 
agreement with respect to relative efficiency measures. However their proxy for 
modernisation (relative investment intensity) did not show any significance in explaining 
SME shares in Greek manufacturing. There was therefore partial agreement between the 
two studies taking into account the very different levels of development of the U.S. and 
Greece.   
 
Mata (1993) investigated Portuguese manufacturing between 1982 and 1986. Like the 
Greek study the time period is short so long run conclusions are difficult to make. Mata 
tests for a slightly different set of variables to AA and TD. However he does find 
evidence that Portuguese SME share in manufacturing was negatively correlated with 
structural barriers to entry such as economies of scale, capital intensity and advertising.  
This is in agreement with AA's results for the US. There was also a significant 
correlation with innovation activity. Mata found evidence that SMEs were less flexible 
than supposed since their share was adversely affected by instability. He also found a 
negative correlation between export-oriented industries and SME presence. 
 
Ming-Wen Hu (1999), broadly using the same explanatory factors, found confirmation 
of the significance of these variables in the case of SMEs in Taiwan in 1991. SMEs 
relative labour productivity (an efficiency variable), and the industry capital–labour ratio 
(a structural barrier to entry) were among the variables that proved significant.  
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It should be noted, however, that not all investigation has agreed with the importance of 
these variables. In an important study of Korean SMEs Nugent found that “the 
technological-organisational factors, which are generally stressed in the literature, on 
balance seem to have contributed little to the observed trends” (Nugent 1996 p.247). 
Instead a range of financial and international marketing variables proved to be 
significant for Korea. 
  
Mulhern and Stewart (1999) – hereafter MS – examined SME manufacturing share in 
Venezuela. They also found structural, efficiency and innovation variables to explain 
SME share (the dependent variable was MVA rather than employment share).
ix
 
However, the focus of their study was to determine whether the model employed in 
the previous literature was appropriately interpreted as a forward looking rational 
expectations specification or an error-correction model. As a result they did not 
pursue model reduction which would provide a clearer indication of the determinants 
of SME share. Nevertheless, they provide some initial support for the AA model. 
 
The present paper wishes to apply the AA model to SME employment share
x
 with 
respect to Venezuelan manufacturing from 1961-1990.
xi
  Following MS we consider 
two additional variables. One is the relative unit wages of the SME stratum and the 
other is GDP - a Venezuelan specific variable explained below. 
 
We use the specification below, following TD and MS, to analyse SME employment 
share, ES.  
 
ESt =  + iXit–1 + iXit + ESt–1 + ut (1) 
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Where the i
th
 explanatory variable is entered both as a lagged level, Xit–1, and a 
difference term, Xit. This autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model may be 
interpreted as a partial adjustment specification, as in TD, or an unrestricted error 
correction formulation, as in MS. In either case the coefficient on lagged SME share, 
, is expected to take values between zero and minus one to ensure correct 
adjustment. 
 
In addition to excluding insignificant variables to secure a parsimonious model one 
can test the restriction, proposed by Levy (1985), that i=i,  i. Imposing this 
restriction yields a model where changes in current dated variables have the same 
impact upon SME share as the lagged level terms. It implies that one may include the 
contemporaneous level of an explanatory variable to capture the combined impact of 
the lagged level and current difference terms.
xii
  
 
As indicated, previous literature has guided us in the type of model and the variables 
used. Full definitions and source of our data are given in the Data Appendix.
xiii
 The 
explanatory factors employed in the model with their proxies and anticipated sign are 
presented in Table II. 
 
The structural variables used in this paper are:  
 
- capital intensity of the manufacturing sector as a whole. This is measured by 
KLR, the capital/labour ratio of the manufacturing sector. Higher capital intensity 
implies “lumpier” machinery and a higher minimum efficient scale thus 
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discouraging small firm presence. The capital assets of manufacturing industry as 
a whole are divided by total labour employed in the industry to obtain this 
measure.  It has an expected negative sign. 
 
- economies of scale, which we proxy with the log of the manufacturing sector‟s 
market size, LSZ (also used  by TD and Schwalbach 1990).  This measures the 
impact of larger market size upon SME share. We expect its sign to be negative, 
i.e. growth of the domestic manufacturing market negatively impacts upon SMEs 
since it is large firms that capture share through advantages of economies of scale. 
 
- import penetration, IP, also used by TD, is envisaged as a barrier to entry for 
national firms. It is not obvious that a greater level of import penetration would be 
more or less favourable to SMEs than large firms. Therefore there is no 
expectation of sign. 
 
We next explore three efficiency variables, the first two of which are linked: 
- the  relative capital intensity of SMEs , RKLS. 
- a pure efficiency differential after difference in factor mix, RKLS, has been 
controlled for, VS. 
 
The productivity of the SME manufacturing sector relative to large firms is split into 
two components, RKLS and VS. For the purposes of the model, and  following TD, 
we derive these two efficiency variables from three stratum specific variables. These 
are performance measures of the relative efficiency of the SME stratum compared to 
the industry as a whole. RES is relative efficiency, defined as the ratio of output to 
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labour employed, and measures labour productivity. It has two influences, the relative 
factor mix, or relative capital intensity (greater capital use should improve the 
output/labour ratio), denoted RKLS, and pure efficiency, VS. RKLS is defined as the 
observed capital to labour ratio of SMEs relative to that of the whole manufacturing 
sector. The unobservable VS is obtained as the residual of an OLS regression of RES 
on RKLS, see the Data Appendix. Both are expected to have positive signs since 
greater relative capital intensity and higher efficiency constitute competitive 
advantage and bring lower costs.  
 
- the relative labour costs of the SME manufacturing stratum, RWS, is our other 
efficiency variable (also used by Miller 1986 and Ming-Wen Hu, 1999). RWS 
measures not only relative wages of SMEs but also the total labour costs to the 
employer (severance pay, insurance, social security, holidays etc). It is a measure of 
the average or unit labour costs.  The sign on this variable is expected to be negative 
since higher relative unit costs of labour in SMEs compared to large firms
xiv
 should, 
ceteris paribus, negatively impact on their share. As well as being an intuitively 
pertinent variable in its own right, we feel it is also a proxy for trade union power and 
the alliance between state and unions – a significant feature of the Venezuela‟s rigid 
labour markets in the formal sector. 
 
We also wish to test for the importance of innovation. In the absence of data on 
patents in Venezuela INVS measures relative investment intensity of SMEs compared 
to large firms. It has also been used by TD as a proxy for innovation. 
xv
  We define it 
as the ratio of value added to capital employed (i.e. capital productivity) of the SME 
stratum compared to industry as a whole. We also expect this sign to be positive. 
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In addition to the above three types of variables previously used in the literature we 
consider a Venezuelan specific variable GDP. We are using this as a proxy for the 
business environment, which we feel is hostile to SMEs. We expect that Venezuelan 
GDP across this period is strongly correlated with falling SME share in 
manufacturing. In times of expansion we expect large firms to capture the majority of 
benefits. Conversely as GDP contracts we expect SMEs to recapture some share, not 
because they thrive on poor conditions - of course they do not - but because large 
firms contract more than they. A similar conclusion, though in the very different 
context of developed economies, has been reached by Spilling (1996) with respect to 
Norway
xvi
 and Trau (1995)
xvii
 with respect to Italy and key European industrial 
economies. Accordingly, we expect a negative sign on this variable. The negative 
correlation between GDP and SME share is confirmed by comparing the top left-hand 
quadrant of figure 1 (real per capita GDP, PCGDP), the top right-hand quadrant of 
figure 2 (employment share, LSS) and the bottom right-hand quadrant of figure 2 
(MVA share, QSS). The significant exception to this is the 1990-1993 period where 
both GDP and SME share expanded – a period of brief experiment in free market 
reforms that allowed a more competitive and less interventionist environment to 
emerge thus encouraging the formation and growth of SMEs.  
  
5. Empirical Results 
 
We use the above variables to estimate various forms of equation (1) over the 
estimation period 1962 – 1990. The results are reported in Table III. T-ratios are given 
in parentheses in the column next to the estimated coefficients. The adjusted 
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coefficient of determination (AdjR
2
), regression standard error (s) and Durbin-Watson 
statistic (DW) are also reported. In addition, there are probability values for F-
versions of misspecification tests for first-order serial correlation (PFSC1), non-linear 
functional Form (PFF1), heteroscedasticity (PFH1), first-order autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (PFARCH1) and Chow‟s second test for predictive 
failure with breakpoint in 1983/84 (PFPF7). The probability for Jarque-Bera‟s chi-
square test for normality is reported as (2N2). A probability value that equals or 
exceeds 0.050 indicates no evidence of misspecification at the 5% level. F-tests for 
model reduction from model ADL1 and ADL2 are denoted by F(ADL1) and 
F(ADL2), respectively. The 5% critical value (denoted F5%) is given in the cell 
adjacent to the corresponding test statistic. Two dummy variables, one taking the 
value of unity in 1976 and zero otherwise (D76) and the other being unity in 1978 and 
zero otherwise (D78), were included in all regressions. They are necessary to remove 
misspecification and capture the impact of a period of substantial change in 
Venezuela as demonstrated by previous tables and figures. 
 
 
All three models reported in Table III, denoted ADL1, ADL2 and ADL3 respectively, 
are free from evident misspecification except ADL1 and ADL2, which exhibit 
predictive failure. However, because this test involves estimating the model over a 
sub-sample, we believe that this misspecification may be due to the inefficiency of 
estimates arising from limited degrees of freedom. For example, there are only two 
degrees of freedom when estimating ADL1 over the sub-sample 1962 – 1983 hence 
we believe that the predictive failure test based upon these estimates may be 
questionable. In contrast, the most parsimonious model reported, ADL3, features 
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more degrees of freedom and exhibits no evidence of predictive failure. Since ADL3 
is our favoured specification and given our doubts over the reliability of the predictive 
failure test when degrees of freedom are extremely limited, we present our results as 
providing valid inference. 
 
The first model reported in Table III, denoted ADL1, is the most general formulation 
and features all the explanatory variables that we consider. All of the variables‟ 
coefficients feature the expected signs (see Table III) except KLRt–1, VSt–1 and VSt. 
However, because these three variables are highly insignificant, according to t-tests, 
we do not draw inferences about their signs. Indeed, many variables are highly 
insignificant so we proceed with model reduction by applying zero restrictions.  
 
Eight variables are removed leaving ADL2. The F-test statistic for deleting these 
variables is 1.611, which is less than the 5% critical value of 3.23, hence we cannot 
reject these restrictions. All retained variables feature the expected sign and all, except 
LSZt–1, are statistically significant according to t-tests. The estimated coefficients of 
variables that are common to ADL1 and ADL2 have the same signs and are, in 
general, of similar magnitude. The difference in magnitude of parameter estimates for 
GDP probably reflects the benefit to ADL2 of increased degrees of freedom. 
  
Removing LSZt–1, and imposing common coefficients on lagged level and differences 
of the RWS and GDP variables gives the model denoted by ADL3. Imposing the joint 
restrictions to move from model ADL1 to ADL3 and ADL2 to ADL3 yield the F-test 
statistics of 2.289 and 2.830, respectively. Since these are less than their respective 
5% critical values, 3.07 and 2.96, we cannot reject the restrictions. All retained 
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variables are statistically significant and exhibit the expected signs. Further, the 
estimated coefficients are broadly similar to those obtained from ADL1 and ADL2. 
The broad similarity of estimates and that F-tests cannot reject the imposed 
restrictions suggests that the estimates are robust across specifications. Added to the 
lack of evident misspecification we present model ADL3 as our favoured 
specification for inference. 
 
MS argue that such an ADL specification is more appropriately interpreted as an error 
correction model (ECM) than partial adjustment mechanism with rational 
expectations. They present evidence supporting this argument for Venezuelan MVA 
share.
xviii
 To further examine the robustness of the models reported in Table III we 
consider ECM representations of employment share.  
 
First we consider the order of integration of the variables using the standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Using a sample of 1963 – 1990, to allow for 
lags and transformations, we find that the ADF test statistics for employment share 
with zero and one lag are –1.578 and –1.536, respectively. Whereas the ADF test for 
the first difference of employment share with zero lags is –4.747. Since the 5% 
critical value, automatically produced by Microfit 4.0, is –2.971 this indicates that 
employment share is integrated of order one. MS present evidence that suggests that 
the explanatory variables are all integrated of order one. This satisfies the necessary 
condition for cointegration. 
 
We follow the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step procedure to build an ECM. In 
Table IV we report two versions of a cointegrating vector that incorporates the 
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variables included in the long run component (INVS, RWS and GDP) of our favoured 
ADL model, reported as ADL3 in Table III. The first cointegrating vector, denoted 
CV1, includes variables that are all statistically significant and feature the expected 
signs. The ADF test statistics for zero and one lag are –4.186 and –4.420, 
respectively. The five and ten percent critical values for cointegrating vectors with 
four variables, as reported in Engle and Yoo (1987), are –4.35 and –4.02, which 
suggests evident cointegration at the 10% level and, possibly, the 5% level. However, 
although this model is free from most forms of misspecification there is evidence of 
significant non-normality. Adding two dummy variables to this model (D76L and 
D78) removes the non-normality, and leaves an equation free from evident 
misspecification – reported as model CV2 in Table IV.xix Once again all variables 
feature the expected signs and are statistically significant. There is also evidence of 
cointegration at the 10% level, and possibly 5% level, with ADF test statistics for zero 
and one lag being –4.390 and –4.126, respectively.  
 
Given cointegration we proceed by building dynamic ECMs. To do this we construct 
the residuals of the cointegrating vectors, reported as CV1 and CV2, which we denote 
as RCV1 and RCV2, respectively. These residuals are then entered, lagged one 
period, with differenced forms of the explanatory variables. The former ensures 
coherence with the long run equilibrium while the latter terms capture short run 
dynamics. The favoured models are reported as ECM1 and ECM2 in Table IV. Both 
ECMs are free from evident misspecification and include only statistically significant 
variables that exhibit the signs expected from economic theory. The model ECM1 
includes the differences of LSZ, INVS, RWS and GDP while ECM2 includes the 
same difference terms except that for INVS, which was statistically insignificant. In 
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terms of variables included in long and short run components, both ECM1 and ECM2 
are virtually identical to the favoured ADL model, ADL3, reported in Table III.  
 
To directly compare the ECMs with model ADL3 the coefficients of the cointegrating 
vectors are multiplied by the absolute value of the adjustment coefficients estimated 
in ECM1 and ECM2. They are reported in equation ECM1 and ECM2 using italic 
emphasis. Comparing the (implied) estimated coefficients of ADL3, ECM1 and 
ECM2, it is clear that they are broadly similar, indicating that the results are robust 
regardless of whether the models are specified in ECM or ADL form.  
 
We draw inferences from model ADL3, although the same qualitative conclusions 
would have been obtained from either ECM1 or ECM2. The adjustment coefficient 
suggests that the change in SME share is adjusted by 74.2% of the previous deviation 
from target share (disequilibrium). Of the structural variables we only retain 
economies of scale (LSZ), while the manufacturing sector‟s capital/labour ratio 
(KLR) and import penetration (IP) were redundant because they were statistically 
insignificant. Relative labour costs (RWS) was the only efficiency variable retained, 
while relative factor mix (RKLS) and pure efficiency (VS) were excluded. Our 
innovation variable, enterprise modernisation (INVS) was retained, as was our 
country specific variable, GDP. These variables provide 88.3% explanatory power in 
model ADL3.  
 
We also use model ADL3 to draw inferences regarding the determinants of the 
decline in SME share. Firstly SME relative unit labour costs (RWS) negatively 
influence their employment share and since this variable clearly has an upward trend 
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(see the top left-hand quadrant of Figure 3) it reduces this share. Secondly, our proxy 
for modernisation, INVS, decreases through time (see the top right-hand quadrant of 
Figure 3) showing poor performance compared to large firms. Due to its positive 
relationship with SME share it reduces that share. Thirdly, GDP has a negative impact 
on employment share and, given its upward trend (see the bottom left-hand quadrant 
of Figure 3), decreases employment share. Thus, we have a long-term downward 
trend in SME share. In the case of the first two variables (RWS and INVS) we note 
that they are efficiency and innovation variables. The structural variable LSZ did not 
prove significant in this study as an explanation of decline although it does help 
explain the cyclical movements around the trend (i.e. it is a variable that determines 
short-term movements).
xx
 However in general we observe that it is the same types of 
factors that cause SME revival in other countries that cause a decline in Venezuela. 
On the one hand it is the absence of efficiency and innovation measures that help 
explain SME relative decline. These results complement those of the other studies 
already mentioned. On the other hand we have pointed to the existence of a business 
environment hostile to SMEs. This is suggested by the 1990-1993 period – the 
exception that proves the rule. It was only when market reforms began to open up an 
uncompetitive economy that SME share could increase in a period of economic 
expansion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has given clear evidence of the long-term decline of Venezuelan SMEs 
expressed both relative to large firms (1961-1990) as well as in an absolute decline in 
their numbers, employment and MVA levels since 1979. There is no evidence for a 
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revival in SME manufacturing share.
xxi
  Economic modelling has concurred with 
previous studies [AA, TD, MS, Mata (1993) and Ming-Wen Hu (1999)] on the 
importance of a key group of variables. In the case of Venezuela structural, 
innovation and efficiency variables prove significant in explaining SME share, but 
unlike the economies in the above mentioned studies, it is the absence in Venezuela 
of innovation and efficiency improvements of smaller firms that helps explain their 
long-term decline. By contrast in these other economies these variables are often 
important in explaining SME revival 
 
While economies of scale, in this study, are found to determine short-term SME 
employment share it is other factors that explain their long-term relative decline. In 
particular the failure to promote efficiency and modernisation improvements in the 
SME manufacturing stratum as well as the hostile business environment are found to 
have caused this relative decline. The reasons for the failure to promote SME 
efficiency and modernisation probably lies deep in the political/economic structure of 
the country and, we would suggest, represent a topic of future research. Nevertheless 
we have pointed to the growing literature that explores this question in relationship to 
the economic crisis of the country as a whole.  However it is the absolute decline of 
SMEs from 1979 that points to the deep crisis of the stratum. Examination of this 
issue is another area worthy of future research. We have noted that the Venezuelan 
economy has been characterised by an uncompetitive business environment and that 
this is linked with SME decline.  
 25 
References 
 
Acs, Z. and Audretsch, D., 1989, „Small Firms in U.S. Manufacturing: A First 
Report‟.  Economic Letters, 31 399-402.  
 
Acs, Z. and Audretsch, D., (eds.),  1990 The Economics of Small Firms: A European 
Challenge. Kluver Academic Publishers.  
 
Birch, D., 1981, „Who Creates Jobs?‟ The Public Interest, 65 (Fall) 3-14.  
 
Buxton, J., The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela. Ashgate 2001. 
 
Carlsson, B., 1984, „The Development and Use of Machine Tools in Historical 
Perspective.‟  Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 5, 91-114. 
 
Carlsson, B., 1991, „The re-emergence of Small-Scale Production: An International 
Perspective‟. Small Business Economics, 3(1), 1-38. 
 
Doi, N and Cowling, M., 1998, “The Evolution of Firm Size and Employment Share 
Distribution in Japanese and UK Manufacturing: A Study of Small Business 
Presence”. Small Business Economics 10:283-292. 
 
Enright, M., Frances A., Saavedra E.S., 1996,  Venezuela the Challenge of 
Competitiveness. Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Hellinger, D., 1996). “Understanding Venezuela‟s Crisis: Dutch Diseases, Money 
Doctors and Magicians”. Latin American Perspectives, vol.110, no.27. 
 
Mata, J., 1993,  Small Firms in Portuguese Manufacturing Industries in Acs Z and 
Audretsch D (eds.), 1993 Small Firm and Entrepreneurship: an East-West Perspective. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Mulhern, A. and Stewart, C., 1999, „Long and Short Run Determinants of Small and 
Medium Size Enterprise Share: The Case of Venezuelan Manufacturing‟. Economics 
of Planning, 32, 191-209. 
 
Miller, E, 1986, “Determinants of the Size of the Small Business Sector”. American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology. 45(4), 389-402. 
 
Ming-Wen Hu, 1999. “The Determinants of SMEs‟ Market Share in 1991 – Taiwan 
Manufacturers”. Small Business Economics, 12, 1-9. 
 
Nugent, J., 1996, „What explains the trend reversal in the size of distribution of 
Korean manufacturing establishments?‟ Journal of Development Economics,  48, 225-
251. 
 
Parades, Carlos E., 1993, „Productivity Growth in Venezuela: The Need to Break 
With the Past.‟ Key Issue Paper. Project Venezuela Competitiva.  
 
 26 
Piore, M. and Sabel, C., 1994, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for 
Prosperity, New York, Basic Books. 
 
Schwalbach, J., 1990, „Small Business in German Manufacturing‟, in Acs, Z. and        
Audretsch, D. (eds.),  The Economics of Small Firms: A European Challenge. Kluver    
Academic Publishers.  
 
Segenberger, W. Loveman, G.W. and Piore, M.J., 1990, „The Re-emergence of Small 
Enterprises: Industrial Restructuring in Industrialised Countries‟. International 
Labour Organization, Geneva. 
 
Spilling, O., 1998, „On the Re-emergence of Small Scale Production: The Norwegian 
Case in International Comparison.‟ Small Business Economics. 10, 401-417. 
 
Storey, D., 1994,  Understanding the Small Business Sector. Routledge, London. 
 
Tambunan, T., 2000,  Development of Small Scale Industries During the New Order 
Government in Indonesia. Ashgate. 
 
Thomadakis, S. and Droucopoulos, V., 1996, „Dynamic Effects in Greek 
Manufacturing : The Changing Share of SMEs, 1983-1990‟. Review of Industrial 
Organization, 11, 69-78. 
 
Trau F., 1997, „Recent Trends in the Size Structure of Italian Manufacturing Firms‟. 
Small Business Economics, 9, 273-385. 
 27 
Data Appendix 
 
The raw data are of annual frequency over the period 1961 to 1990.  
 
 
GDP    Real (1985) GDP (billions of Bolivares) transformed to make constant and 
current price data equal in 1984. Source: International Monetary Fund 
International Financial Statistics (IMFIFS) line 99b.p. 
KL Real (1984) capital of large firms in manufacturing (billions of Bolivares). 
KS Real (1984) capital of SMEs in manufacturing (billions of Bolivares). 
LL Number of persons employed in large firms in the manufacturing sector. 
LS Number of persons employed in SMEs in the manufacturing sector. 
M Nominal imports of goods and services (billions of Bolivares). Source: 
IMFIFS line 99c. 
NL Number of large firms in the manufacturing sector. 
NS Number of SMEs in the manufacturing sector. 
P84 GDP price deflator (1985~100) transformed into 1984~100. Source: IMFIFS 
line 99bip. 
QL Real (1984) value added in manufacturing for large firms (billions of    
Bolivares). 
QS Real (1984) value added in manufacturing for SMEs (billions of Bolivares). 
WL Nominal average annual salaries for employees in large firms (billions of 
Bolivares). 
WS Nominal average annual salaries for employees in SMEs (billions of 
Bolivares). 
 Source for KL, KS, LL, LS, NL, NS, QL, QS, WL and WS is Oficina Central 
de Estadística e Informática (1990). We use the method of linear 
interpolation to obtain values for missing observations. 
 
The transformed and derived variables obtained from this raw data are given below. 
KLR=(KL+KS)/(LL+LS)   INVS=(QS/KS)/[(QL+QS)/(KL+KS)]. 
IP=[M/(P84/100)]/(QL+QS).   LSZ=ln(QL+QS) 
RES=(QS/LS)/[(QL+QS)/(LL+LS)].  RKLS=(KS/LS)/KLR.   
RWS=WS/(WL+WS).   SS=QS/(QL+QS) for output share and 
ES=LS/(LL+LS) for employment share. 
VS is not observable. It is obtained, following TD as the residual from the regression: 
RESt = 0 + 1RKLSt + VSt; where 0 and 1 are constant parameters estimated by 
ordinary least squares. 
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Table I: Percentage Change in Three Main Indicators 
 
Real GDP per-capita 1961-79: 36.6% (1.7% p.a.) 1979-90: -20.6% (-1.9% p.a.) 
Gross fixed capital as 
% of GDP 
1970-78: 95% (7.7% p.a.) 1978-90: -71% (-9.8% p.a.) 
Real oil income 1970-80: 212% (10.9% p.a.) 1980-90: -48%  (-5.8% p.a.) 
 
 
Table II: Explanatory Factors, their Proxies and Expected Signs 
 
Variable Variable 
Type 
Explanatory factor Proxy Sign 
ES Adjustment SME share Employment share 
ES=LS/(LL+LS) 
Negative 
(lag) 
KLR  
Structural 
(barriers to 
entry) 
Capital intensity Capital/Labour ratio  
KLR = (KL1+KS)/(LL+LS) 
Negative 
LSZ Economies of scale 
 
Manufacturing sector‟s market 
size LSZ = ln(QL+QS) 
Negative 
IP Import penetration Total imports/Total production  
IP = [M/(P84/100)]/(QL+QS) 
Any 
RKLS  
 
Efficiency 
 
Relative factor mix Relative capital intensity  
RKLS =(KS/LS)/KL  
Positive 
VS Pure efficiency Efficiency differential after 
controlling for factor mix VS 
Positive 
RWS Relative labour costs Relative wages RWS  
= WS/(WL+WS) 
Negative 
INVS Innovation 
 
Modernisation and 
innovation. 
Relative investment intensity 
INVS=(QS/KS)/[(QL+QS)/(KL1+
KS)]. 
Positive 
GDP Country 
specific 
Prejudicial business 
environment 
GDP Negative 
 
Notes to Table II. The first column specifies the title of each variable, the second 
column gives the explanatory factor it is intended to capture while the third column 
details proxy used to characterise its effect. The fourth column indicates the sign of a 
variable‟s coefficient in model (1) expected from economic theory. The term “(lag)” 
refers to the expected sign of the lagged value of that variable. 
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Table III: Estimated Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models 
 
Model  ADL1 ADL2 ADL3 
Sample  1962 – 1990 1962 – 1990 1962 – 1990 
Dependent 
Variable  
ESt ESt ESt 
 Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Intercept 0.217 (0.769) 0.564 (4.959) 0.549 (10.109) 
ESt–1 –0.310 (–1.510) –0.737 (–5.567) –0.742 (–10.061) 
LSZt–1 –0.041 (–1.308) –0.021 (–1.228)   
LSZt –0.114 (–2.756) –0.111 (–4.978) –0.125 (–6.631) 
INVSt–1 0.054 (0.337) 0.050 (3.186) 0.048 (3.804) 
INVSt 0.090 (0.693) 0.026 (1.675)   
RWSt     –0.223 (–4.379) 
RWSt–1 –0.035 (–0.362) –0.168 (–3.090)   
RWSt –0.155 (–1.025) –0.217 (–3.230)   
GDPt     –0.0005 (–7.699) 
GDPt–1 –0.00004 (–0.240) –0.0004 (–4.103)   
GDPt –0.0001 (–0.695) –0.0005 (–5.523)   
KLRt–1 0.057 (0.449)     
KLRt –0.168 (–0.632)     
RKLSt–1 0.101 (0.918)     
RKLSt 0.035 (0.313)     
VSt–1 –0.069 (–0.228)     
VSt –0.188 (–0.888)     
IPt–1 –0.012 (–1.369)     
IPt –0.022 (–2.249)     
D76 0.027 (3.431) 0.027 (4.254) 0.022 (3.493) 
D78 –0.030 (–2.232) –0.043 (–7.531) –0.044 (–6.886) 
AdjR
2 
0.933  0.914  0.883  
S 0.0045  0.0051  0.0060  
DW 2.303  1.499  1.707  
PFSC1 0.548  0.423  0.587  
PFFF1 0.511  0.967  0.315  
P2N2 0.768  0.965  0.643  
PFH1 0.800  0.485  0.548  
PFARCH1 0.718  0.466  0.706  
PFPF7 0.000  0.004  0.288  
F(ADL1)   1.611 F5%=3.23 2.289 F5%=3.07 
F(ADL2)     2.830 F5%=2.96 
 
Notes to Table III. Probability values are reported for misspecification tests. The 
statistics F(ADL1) and F(ADL2) are F-tests for imposing the restrictions 
required to obtain the specified model from equation ADL1 and equation ADL2, 
respectively. The 5% critical values for these F-tests are given in cells adjacent to the 
test statistics. 
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Table IV: Estimated Error Correction Models 
 
Model  CV1 ECM1 CV2 ECM2 
Sample  1961 – 1990 1962 – 1990 1961 – 1990 1962 – 1990 
Dependent Variable 
 
ESt ESt ESt ESt 
Intercept 0.691 
(21.491) 
0.003 
(2.446) 
0.731 
(20.491) 
0.0007 
(0.280) 
INVSt 0.062 
(3.265) 
0.040 0.052 
(3.769) 
0.040 
RWSt –0.180 
(–2.399) 
–0.117 –0.198 
(–3.100) 
–0.151 
GDPt –0.0007 
(–17.534) 
–0.0005 –0.0008 
(–17.163) 
–0.0006 
LSZt  –0.090 
(–6.066) 
 –0.062 
(–2.920) 
INVSt  0.025 
(2.109) 
  
 
RWSt  –0.237 
(5.675) 
 –0.385 
(5.676) 
GDPt  –0.0005 
(–7.895) 
 –0.0004 
(–3.515) 
RCV1t–1  –0.650 
(–6.609) 
  
RCV2t–1    –0.761 
(–3.252) 
D76  0.024 
(4.392) 
  
 
D76L   0.020 
(2.330) 
 
D78  –0.042 
(–8.098) 
–0.040 
(–4.671) 
–0.040 
(–4.256) 
AdjR
2 
0.979 0.922 0.990 0.748 
s 0.0115 0.0049 0.0080 0.0088 
LL 93.585 117.840 105.504 99.519 
PFSC1 0.265 0.270 0.409 0.426 
PFFF1 0.314 0.988 0.780 0.624 
P2N2 0.000 0.979 0.754 0.075 
PFH1 0.123 0.548 0.061 0.370 
PFARCH1 0.755 0.431 0.801 0.894 
PFPF7 0.615 0.623 0.106 0.914 
DF –4.186  –4.390  
ADF1 –4.420  –4.126  
 
Notes to Table IV. The coefficients reported in italic emphasis in the ECMs are the 
products of the cointegrating vectors‟ estimated parameters and the absolute values of 
the estimated adjustment coefficients given in the ECMs. This allows a comparison of 
the estimated long run coefficients with those reported for the ADL models given in 
Table III. The Engle and Yoo (1987) DF (no lags) critical values for testing a 
cointegrating vector with four variables are –4.35 (5%) and –4.02 (10%).  
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Figure 1: Real Per-capita GDP, Establishment Numbers and Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Employment Numbers, SME Employment Share, SME MVA and 
MVA Share 
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Figure 3: Determinants of SME Employment Share 
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Endnotes 
 
                                               
i  SMEs are defined in Venezuela as establishments employing up to  99 workers. 
 
ii  This has sometimes been expressed as a hypothesis of a U or V shaped time series. 
 
iii Different studies vary in their definition of SME size although almost all use the same variable – 
employment numbers. Acs and Audretsch model different size categories up to 500 employees. Both 
Coi and Dowling 1998 (UK) and Ming-Wen Hu 1998 (Taiwan) define SMEs as less than 100 
employees, while Nugent 1994 (Korea) examines both small firms (5-19) and medium size firms (20-
199). Trau 1995 (Italy) considers firms from 10-100. 
 
iv  However Tambunan (2000) employs data on developing countries. However most of it is not 
available after the late 1970s. 
 
v The statistics of this paper have been obtained from official census material collected by the Oficina 
Central de Estadística e Informatíca (Caracas, Venezuela – OCEI). Data for profit across our whole 
time period are not available.  
 
vi  Venezuelan statistics cover establishment not firm numbers. Since the vast majority of firms are 
single establishment we believe this does not present a problem. 
 
vii However there were increases in average employment size especially  in the first  period. Large firms 
began in 1961 with an average size of 298 while SMEs average employment size was 14 employees. 
By 1979 large firms had grown to an average size of 356 while SMEs had 21. By 1995 large firms had  
declined to an  average employment size of 330 and small firms had risen slightly to 25.   
 
viii  Absolute numbers of firms is clearly a limited  piece of information but nevertheless it is very 
important since it speaks of the vitality of a sector.  Long-term stagnation of the numbers of firms in 
the SME stratum is a strong indication of  something seriously wrong in the business environment 
  
ix GDP, which does not fall into these groups, was also found to determine SME share. 
 
x The reason for this change in the dependent variable is as follows.  Many studies only examine SME 
share with respect to one variable – either output or employment share. However these two variables 
may have opposing trends. For example SME employment share may be decreasing while output share 
is increasing – possibly a sign of increased relative labour productivity in the SME stratum. For 
example the Korean figures for SME employment and MVA share from 1963-1988 have opposing 
trends: 
 
Employment % share   1963    1988 
Medium size firms (20-199 employees) 37.4    40.1 
 
Value added % share   1963    1988 
Medium size firms (20-199 employees) 33.5    30 
 
(Source Nugent 1996) 
 
Here we observe that medium size firms saw an increase in their employment share but a drop in their 
value added share. Perhaps it is for this reason that Nugent tests for both these variables as the 
dependent variable in this thorough study. An unambiguous test should refer to both variables in order 
to have a clear picture of what is happening to SMEs. 
 
xi  The model could not be estimated up to 1995 due to the data constraints with respect to the crucial 
capital assets data series upon which many explanatory variables are based.  This was due to changes in  
its  definition so that the authors were not confident that reliable splicing could be effected.   
 
xii Since, with the restriction imposed, iXit = iXi,t-1 + iXit,  i. 
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xiii  Our raw data is in the form of 3 digit SIC sectors which are aggregated into stratum (i.e. SME and 
large firm stratum). Although we have this breakdown into 3 digit sectors for share of output similarly 
disaggregated data is not available for all our explanatory variables. Hence we do not employ a panel 
analysis. 
 
xiv  Venezuela has had a long history of minimum wage legislation as well as a battery of workers 
rights. These are applied to SMEs and large firms in the same measure thus negatively impacting on 
SMEs  relative costs. 
 
xv AA originally employed patents as a measure of innovation. This is probably the best measure. 
However this data is not available in Venezuela.  Following later work, such as TD, we use a related 
variable, modernisation, which is proxied by capital intensity. 
 
xvi  Spilling (1996 p.401) with respect to Norwegian SME increasing share comments “Rather than 
being attributed to the strengths of SMEs, the growing share of SMEs may be interpreted as a result of 
industrial weakness.” 
 
xvii  Trau comments… “Data shows that in the course of the „80s the main industrial countries of 
Europe- with the notable exception of Germany – have experienced a further reduction in the average 
size of manufacturing firms, which was declining since the mid „70s. Yet in all the countries concerned 
the increase in the relative “weight” in the employment shares of small enterprises is associated with an 
overall decline of employment levels in absolute numbers (smaller firms do not succeed in making up 
for the whole amount of job losses in the industrial sector).” (Trau, 1997, p273). 
 
xviii This study confirms the results of the previous study by MS of Venezuelan SME manufacturing 
value added share since variables in all three major categories of explanatory factors, structural, 
efficiency and innovation, are statistically significant in both analyses. However, there are differences 
in terms of the particular variables that are significant in each study. This reflects the different 
dependent variable employed in each study and that model reduction is only conducted in the present 
paper. Nevertheless, the inferences are broadly robust across these two studies. 
 
xix The dummy variable D76L takes the value of unity from 1976 to 1990 and is zero otherwise. 
 
xx Since DLSZ is not trended (stationary), see the bottom right-hand quadrant of Figure 3, it is not 
economies of scale that cause the decline in Venezuelan SME share according our favoured model. 
 
xxi  However one could choose a short time period such as 1974-1983 and find such a trend. SME share 
tended to fall in periods of fast growth in the economy and fall less rapidly (and sometimes increase) in 
times of GDP stagnation. 
